and 112,000 unauthorized) immigrants or 28% in 2000; in contrast, about 129,000 arrived in New York, the second leading U.S. immigration state (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 2002 Service , 2003 .
In general, Americans are ambivalent about immigration. They welcome and enjoy the benefits of (even if not always acknowledging) inexpensive immigrant labor, for example, even as they worry (probably unnecessarily) that immigration may erode cultural solidarity and national identity and cohesion (Bean & Stevens, 2003; Clark, 2003; Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002) . Anxieties about the sociocultural repercussions of immigration notwithstanding, the latter half of the 1990s witnessed growing recognition that immigrants play an important and increasingly prominent role in the U.S. economy (Mexico-U.S. Migration Panel, 2001) . Although 11% of the country's total population was foreign born in 2000, 14% were between the ages of 18 and 64, the prime employment years (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003) . Of those in that age group actually working, the foreign-born percentage was equally high, at 14%. The percentage of children in the country who were either immigrants or the children of immigrants was even higher, more than 20%, indicating that the nation's future workforce will be even more dependent on immigration in the future (Hernandez, 1999) .
IMMIGRATION AND WORK
Many immigrants come to the United States expressly for the purpose of working, including those who come as unauthorized labor migrants from Mexico and those who enter under various kinds of employment-based visas. Most of those who ostensibly come for non-work-related reasons, including those who enter under the various preference categories for family reunification visas, end up holding jobs that are similar in kind and pay to many of those who enter the country with work-related visas (Sorensen, Bean, Ku, & Zimmerman, 1992) . Since 1990, however, those entering on work-related visas have been somewhat more highly skilled than family-based entrants. Thus, as the number of immigrants in the national workforce grows, the implications of this rise may increasingly depend on visa type as well as on legal status. But even more important, the implications of this growth depend on the fact that the country's employment structures have been changing. The nature and magnitude of newcomer arrivals must thus be understood in the context of recent U.S. demographic changes and economic restructuring. These include a relative decline in manufacturing employment (especially high-wage, unionized jobs), a relative increase in service-industry employment, declining or stagnant real earnings at the middle and the bottom of the income distribution, a growing number of working-age males (especially young African Americans) who are dropping out of the labor force, decreasing wage gaps between men and women at equivalent levels of education, and declining levels of childbearing among native-born women (Bean & Bell-Rose, 1999; Bean & Stevens, 2003) .
The bimodal educational distribution of today's immigrants is another striking feature of contemporary immigration. Recent immigrants coming to the country have had either a high level of education (i.e., a college degree) or a low level (i.e., without a high school diploma). In 2000, for example, 26% of adult immigrants had completed a college degree or higher, a figure slightly larger than that for the native population (25%). At the same time, 33% of all adult immigrants had not completed high school, compared to only 13% of adult natives. Among those with a high school diploma or some college education (but not a college degree), immigrants were relatively less numerous than natives (41% compared to 61%; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003) . This hollowed out educational distribution mirrors the pattern of change in the labor market in recent years, namely, substantial growth in the numbers of high-end and low-end jobs, with much lower increases in the middle range (Milkman & Dwyer, 2002) .
The growth in numbers of less skilled immigrants presents a puzzle for social scientists. The migration has continued even as earnings at the bottom of the income distribution have stagnated and the employment opportunities of disadvantaged native racial and ethnic minorities, especially African Americans, have stalled (Bean & Bell-Rose, 1999; Waldinger & Lichter, 2003) . Given the relative disappearance of manufacturing jobs in cities, where many African Americans live, and the movement of middle-class African American role models to the suburbs, which has further disadvantaged African Americans (Wilson 1987 (Wilson , 1996 , how does one explain the growth in less skilled immigration? Why should more and more less skilled Mexican migrants come to the United States when the demand for less skilled labor appears to be declining? The answer has partly to do with imbalances in demography and economy in Mexico, which continue to generate more labor supply than demand (Mexico-United States Binational Migration Study, 1997) . Although this disequilibrium is less extreme today than in the past, a shortage of job opportunities in Mexico still makes even the worst jobs and limited employment prospects in the United States attractive to many Mexicans (Porter, 2003) . Moreover, social networks among less skilled immigrant groups foster migration and confer recruitment and hiring advantages relative to African American workers at the low end of the wage scale (Massey, Alarcón, Durand, & Gonzalez, 1987; Waldinger, 2001; Waldinger & Lichter, 2003) .
What are the implications of the substantial low-skilled immigration flows for the employment and wages of others already here? Two decades of empirical research on the labor market consequences of immigration have found few adverse short-run effects on native workers, although this research has also shown that increased immigration of less skilled workers does limit employment opportunities for less skilled immigrants who had arrived earlier (Bean, Van Hook, & Fossett, 1999; Friedberg & Hunt, 1999) . If today's immigrants somewhat hurt the economic chances of other immigrants, does this mean that the prospects for moving up the job ladder into the economic mainstream are diminishing for contemporary immigrants, relative to earlier generations? Are opportunities for immigrants lessening in part because economic restructuring is hollowing out the middle of the job structure, leaving fewer pathways to upward mobility? To what degree is this worrisome possibility exacerbated by the fact that so many of the new immigrants are nonWhite and thus are presumably subject to racial and ethnic discrimination?
IMMIGRATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
In recent decades, the structure of job opportunities in the United States has increasingly taken an hourglass or U-shaped form (Bell, 1999; Milkman & Dwyer, 2002; Piore & Sabel, 1984; Wright & Dwyer, 2002) . The relative decline in the manufacturing sector (which shifted from employing 33% of private-sector workers in 1970 to 17% in 2000) has resulted in fewer jobs that provide a middle-class lifestyle, especially for persons without college educations. Although many factors affect the structure of the labor market, these trends suggest diminishing opportunities for upward mobility, particularly for workers without college degrees. Discrimination in hiring, pay, and promotion on the basis of ascriptive characteristics such as race and ethnicity, nativity, and gender is harder to overcome under conditions of declining opportunities, especially for persons at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Such persons' chances for betterment depend on the number and kind of midrange opportunities for employment as well as the nature and strength of barriers that stand in the way of achievement. Research indicating that racial and ethnic groups, especially minority women, and often immigrants are concentrated at the bottom of the job distribution heightens concerns about emergent hourglass structures of employment and job mobility. This is the context in which we must evaluate the prospects for new immigrants. They are not only newcomers to America's workforce but also new members of ethnic groups whose prospects for mobility could be impeded by the extent to which they are treated as racialized minorities. Evidence of upward mobility among low-end immigrants would suggest that the racial and ethnic status of immigrants might not constrain opportunity to the degree that perspectives focusing on the effects of race and ethnicity alone (without taking nativity into account) would imply. In conducting research on what happens to racial and ethnic groups in the labor market, it is thus crucial to disaggregate outcomes by nativity. Moreover, it is also important to ascertain the extent of gender variation, given that immigrant women may start out in very low-level jobs. In what follows, we disaggregate employment and mobility outcomes by race and ethnicity, nativity, and gender, something all too often neglected in labor market studies.
INCORPORATION, RACE AND ETHNICITY, AND NATIVITY
Ascertaining whether and to what degree racial and ethnic discrimination might worsen opportunities for upward mobility for today's less skilled immigrants requires considering the extent to which ideas about their economic incorporation involve assumptions about their status as racialized minorities. Competing theories of immigrant incorporation offer optimistic (in the case of assimilation perspectives) or pessimistic (in the case of ethnic disadvantage perspectives) pictures of the process or a mixture of the two (in the case of segmented assimilation views; Bean & Stevens, 2003) . The predominance of any one of these views has depended substantially, if not always explicitly, on whether a given immigrant group is treated as a racialized, disadvantaged minority group. Ethnic disadvantage perspectives tend to construct immigrant groups as non-Anglo minorities subject to discrimination, whereas assimilation perspectives tend to deemphasize racial and ethnic status and focus on newcomers just starting to move up the economic ladder. Thus, the issue of immigrant economic incorporation in the United States is inextricably confounded with the issue of race and ethnicity (Bean & Bell-Rose, 1999) . To be sure, the difference between the two perspectives is relative rather than absolute. Nonetheless, the question of the pace of assimilation cannot be separated from the question of the extent to which new immigrants tend to be regarded as members of disadvantaged and racialized minority groups.
The case of the Mexican-origin population exemplifies the difficulty of strictly applying either perspective to new immigrants. Each view finds some evidence in support of its claims. On one hand, research suggests that persons of Mexican origin often face job discrimination, although less frequently than African Americans do (Bean & Tienda, 1987; Perlmann & Waldinger, 1999) . It is also evident that data not disaggregated by nativity present an incomplete picture of the economic status of the group. The large gap in edu-cation and earnings between immigrant and native-born persons of Mexican origin may have more to do with the different levels of economic development in Mexico and the United States than with discrimination (Bean, Berg, & Van Hook, 1996; Bean, Gonzalez-Baker, & Capps, 2001; Trejo, 1996 Trejo, , 1997 . Research that lumps all Mexican-origin persons together, or all immigrants together in general, thus tends to yield a negatively biased view of the economic position of either Mexican natives or the U.S.-born members of immigrant groups. To address here the question of the role and position of non-White immigrant groups in the United States workforce, we provide below a brief industry profile of the U.S. labor force by nativity as well as an analysis of immigrant job quality and mobility in the 1990s. We begin by examining employment and industry patterns in the country, disaggregated by nativity and gender, in 1990 and 2000. We then go on to look at job quality and mobility, with job quality defined by occupation, industry, and relative earnings, using 1990 and 2000 census data.
DATA AND APPROACH
Our profile focuses on immigrant employment in the nation using the decennial census data for 1990 and 2000. We use the 1% Public-Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) for 1990 and 2000, for all civilian workers between the ages of 18 and 64. Differences exist between the 1990 and 2000 PUMS in geographic, race, and industry and occupational codes. We address these primarily by using the International Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS, 2003) version of these data compiled for comparability at the University of Minnesota. Not only do these data allow an assessment of patterns of aggregate change since 1990, but also, the large numbers of observations permit us to gauge variations by nativity, race and ethnicity, gender, industry, and metropolitan area simultaneously. If inequities in employment opportunities and outcomes facing certain groups are to be improved by public policies, insight into the factors causing the inequities is crucial. This knowledge can be obtained only if we know which groups are most severely affected.
We classified race using the 1990 census codes and assigned Spanish write-in to the other race category (hence, our figures correspond to published figures). In 2000, we assigned a primary race designation, so we placed those persons identifying themselves in more than one race category into the other race category. Arguments can be advanced to use a different categorization, but the alternatives have both advantages and disadvantages, as does the approach we use here. In 2000, it is necessary to combine metropolitan aggregates (primary metropolitan statistical areas) with submetro-politan aggregates containing at least a population of 400,000 (super public use microdata areas) to construct comparable 1990 consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSA), which results in some size discrepancies (with 1990 and with the actual 2000 CMSA size). More difficult is the wholesale change in the nature and codes for industry (and occupation) used in the 2000 census. We use the University of Minnesota IPUMS (2003) that generates a comparable industry coding from the 1950 census to the present. We further aggregate these latter codes into the familiar 13-category classification (further collapsed to 12) often used in the pre-2000 census era.
IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT AND JOB QUALITY
By 2000, about one in seven of the country's workers were foreign born, up from about less than one in nine in 1990. The already significant role of immigrants in the country's labor force thus increased appreciably over the decade. Figure 1 shows that changes in the immigrant labor force share varied by industry and gender, as one might anticipate. For example, growth in the immigrant women's share of the personal services industry jumped 8 percentage points, whereas immigrant men's share of the agricultural and construction workforces far outstripped gains by immigrant women in these sectors. But in general, the relative foreign-born presence in the nation's workforce grew across all industry categories. Immigrants' share of employment increased more slowly (or not at all) in white-collar industries where natives were most concentrated (finance, insurance, and real estate; professional and related; and public administration).
Immigrants play an important role in the labor force, although their specific contribution varies by gender and industry. Table 1 shows the industry distribution of immigrant and native-born workers in the United States. Although the labor force experienced net growth for most industries during the 1990s, marked differences were apparent between immigrants and natives. The immigrant labor force grew faster than its native-born counterpart and was a major source of net growth in the country. Bigger net losses of native rather than immigrant workers occurred in transportation, communications, and wholesale trade, whereas net native but not immigrant gains took place in public administration. Elsewhere, the patterns tended toward similarity by nativity. When one group's industry share went up or down, so did the other's. In the case of both immigrants and natives, for example, employment in manufacturing jobs fell, reflecting the broader shift in the country toward service sector and information jobs continuing to take place during the 1990s. Overall, immigrant employment in the 1990s was concentrated in the lower reaches of the American job structure. This raises the question of the degree to which immigrants may have contributed to the increasingly bifurcated pattern of job growth, with more jobs being added at the high and low ends of the employment distribution and fewer being added in the middle.
JOB QUALITY AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
We now turn to the shifting patterns of employment in the United States in the 1990s, disaggregating our data by nativity, race and ethnicity, and gender. Here, we define jobs as positions occurring at the intersection of industry and occupation, arrayed by their relative earnings into quintiles of the labor force, using census data for the years 1990 and 2000. Wages are only one measure of job quality, but they are the only consistently available indicator available in most sources of data on the labor force. Moreover, the distribution of jobs by relative earnings is fundamental for tracking the forces driving changes in income inequality. We follow the examples of research in this vein by Milkman and Dwyer (2002) and Wright and Dwyer (2000 -2001 , focusing on the changing distribution of jobs during the 1990s expansion. Rather than job quality deciles, however, we use job quality quintiles.
For the decade of the 1990s, we examine a matrix of 1,035 possible jobs created by crossing 45 occupational and 23 industrial categories (U.S. Council of Economic Advisors, 1996) . Mean annual earnings were calculated for each job in the matrix. We then rank ordered the jobs from lowest to highest mean annual earnings and divided them into five groups, each containing roughly 20% of all full-time workers. The exact share in each quintile, so defined, is not exactly 20% because the earnings cutoffs arrayed across jobs do not neatly divide up the earnings array. What results is a fivefold classification of jobs that range from the lower, or first quintile (the lowest 20% of mean earners) to the upper, or fifth quintile (the highest 20%). Table 2 shows the jobs that had the three largest workforces in each quintile in 1990. The lowest-earning jobs were in retail trades such as food service and agriculture. At the upper end were managers and executives in durable manufacturing, along with executives and financial personnel in finance, insurance, and real estate.
In 2000, about 20.8 million full-time workers were employed nationally in the top job-quality quintile (IPUMS, 2003) . Our analysis next focuses on the net change in the number of full-time employees from 1990 to 2000 in the United States (Figure 2 ). The measure captures job destruction as well as creation. Figure 2 shows the net change in the number of persons employed in each job-quality quintile over the period from 1990 to 2000. The U-shaped pattern indicates that the economic boom of the latter part of the 1990s did not eliminate (and possibly reinforced) an hourglass pattern of job distribution (Milkman & Dwyer, 2002) . In the United States, growth was disproportionate at each end: Both the number of low-quality and high-quality jobs expanded to a greater degree than did those of middle quality. To be sure, the boom of the 1990s is reflected in the gains in the number of high-quality jobs. But this was balanced by apparent bad news: An almost equal number of lowquality full-time jobs were created.
To interpret these data for racial and ethnic groups and then foreign-born members, it is important to disaggregate the findings by nativity, gender, and race and ethnicity. Immigrants generally start out at low points in the job distribution. In some states, such as California, where immigrants make up a large proportion of the workforce, they accounted for more than half of the growth both at the bottom and top of the job distribution, substantially contributing to a polarized structure of growth in that state from 1994 to 2000. But in California's case, they also made up a large share of growth in the middle part of the job distribution, accounting for more than three fourths of midrange increases (Bean & Lowell, 2003) . Immigrant women especially start at low points in the U.S. job structure compared to immigrant men (reflecting women's more traditional roles in many countries of origin and their lower levels of human capital). However, greater numbers of immigrant women work outside the home in the United States compared to women in their countries of origin. Immigrant women also improve their economic status faster in this country than their male counterparts do (Bean et al., 2001) , at least across successive generations, because of the United States's relatively egalitarian opportunity structure. That different gender dynamics may be at work for immigrant women is indicated by the fact that, whereas foreignborn males have been found to account for appreciable portions of employment growth in the high and middle parts of the distribution job structure, foreign-born females account for a large portion of the growth at the bottom (Bean & Lowell, 2003) .
Disaggregating results by gender and nativity as well as by race and ethnicity can thus illuminate the dynamics underlying job growth patterns in the United States. This is revealed in Figure 3 , which shows that Asian male immigrants contributed almost a quarter of the country's growth in highquality male jobs, whereas Latino male immigrants accounted for almost one half of the growth of the lowest quality male jobs. More surprising, however, Latino immigrants contributed almost half of the rather strong growth in middle-range jobs among males. This Asian-Latino polarity is not as clear cut among women. As Figure 4 shows, Asian immigrant females made nontrivial contributions to the growth of upper end jobs, but Asian females also made substantive contributions to lower end job growth among women. And native Latinas made larger contributions to high-end female job growth than did immigrant Latinas, who were the single largest contributors to the growth of low-quality female jobs in the country. A bimodal pattern of job quality growth, in short, occurred within nativity groups among women, regardless of race and ethnic group. For male full-time workers, the bimodality was anchored by Asian immigrants at the high end and Latino immigrants at the low end. 
JOB QUALITY MOBILITY AMONG IMMIGRANTS
These results illustrate the significance of immigration in employment patterns. They also indicate why it is important to consider the possibility that newcomer dynamics, in addition to racial and ethnic group dynamics, may play an important role in helping to interpret job change patterns (Bean & Stevens, 2003) . Although most immigrants are members of racial and ethnic groups, their race and ethnicity may not fully explain why they start out at low points in the job distribution. Another possibility is, simply, that they are inexperienced societal newcomers. To the degree that this is the case, however, and to the degree that their race and ethnicity does not fully constrain their movement toward joining the economic mainstream, we would expect their labor market outcomes to improve as they gain job experience and familiarity with employment opportunities in the destination country. Public policies intended to provide avenues for upward mobility for less skilled members of racial and ethnic groups have generally focused on generating more work opportunities in the middle part of the job distribution by solving demand-side difficulties. Insofar as workers experience prejudice based on their race and ethnicity, the development of successful policies may require further efforts to overcome the effects of discrimination. But if today's Latino and Asian immigrants are more similar to earlier waves of newcomers (mostly of European origin), they will be able move up once they gain experience in the labor market. The effects of newcomer status and those of discrimination are not, of course, mutually exclusive, but an attempt to disentangle their effects is nonetheless useful. Most workers, native and immigrant, tend to earn more as they age and as they gain job experience. For immigrants, years of work experience gained after entering the U.S. labor market is more valuable than experience in the home country. On arrival, many immigrants often lack language and U.S.-specific job skills; as skills and language improve, they are rewarded with better jobs and earnings. Research on earnings that compares natives' work experience in the United States and immigrants'experience outside the country generally supports the claim that recent immigrants earn less than natives who have an equal number of years of work experience. Yet even after 2 decades of U.S.-specific experience, immigrants generally fail to catch up completely to the earnings levels of otherwise similar native workers (controlling for such factors as education; Smith & Edmonston, 1997) . But this does not mean that immigrants fail to show substantial mobility.
Lacking longitudinal data, we cannot conduct a fully adequate analysis of the earnings growth process, but we can get a good approximation of immigrant mobility by tracking year-of-arrival cohorts over time. To do this, we group immigrants here into two cohorts according to the years that they reported arriving in the United States: those who arrived between 1970 and 1979 and those who arrived between 1980 and 1989. To the degree that job quality mobility occurs, one would expect that immigrants in these arrival cohorts shifted into higher quality jobs during the economic boom years, from 1994 to 2000. Figure 5 shows the absolute level of change for each cohort across job-quality quintiles in the United States during the 1990s. For example, the figure shows that the number of high-quality jobs being held by members of the 1980-1989 cohort increased by about 200,000 (about 100,000 in each of the 4th and 5th quintiles) during the decade, whereas the number of low-end jobs being held by the members of the cohort decreased by about the same amount. Thus, this cohort shows considerable upward mobility, with substantial losses in lower quality jobs and strong gains in upper quality jobs. The 1970-1979 arrival cohort shows the same pattern, although by the 1990s, the members of this cohort have been in the United States such a long period of time that they also start to incur attrition out of the labor force (in the form either of retirement or return migration to countries of origin). In general, this pattern of greater cohort decline in relatively bad jobs and either growth or much less decline in good jobs suggests that many immigrants do move into better quality jobs over time. These findings also suggest the importance of disaggregating the labor-market experiences of racial and ethnic groups by nativity. Failure to do so may yield a more pessimistic portrait of the constraints facing recent immigrants than may actually be warranted.
CONCLUSION
The 1990s were a period of record immigration to the United States, with both legal and unauthorized immigrants arriving in the country, a trend that will likely continue in the 21st century. Immigrants make up a proportionately larger share of the workforce than of the population. Although many highly skilled as well as less skilled immigrants have been coming to the United States, most are among the less well educated, a fact that is consistent with the employment patterns described above. Many observers have been concerned that a bimodal pattern of immigrant education, with many immigrants either being poorly or very well educated, overlaps too closely with the increasingly polarized distribution of job growth in the country. Our analysis of changing employment patterns and the shifting distribution of bad and good jobs in the economic-boom decade (1990 to 2000) suggests, however, that immigration is not primarily driving the emergence of a polarized job structure in the United States. Much of that structure derives from changes among the native born, especially among women, suggesting that shifts in labor demand explain the pattern rather than increases in the supply of lowskilled and highly skilled immigrant workers. Disaggregating results by race and ethnicity, nativity, and gender reveals the importance of newcomer dynamics to labor market outcomes. In the United States, immigrants do not, in general, appear entirely to be stuck in low-end jobs. Our analyses of arrival cohort data suggest substantial immigrant upward mobility, mainly from lower to middle-range but also to higher range jobs. This does not mean that predictions based on racial and ethnic stratification theories are wrong, but it does suggest that such perspectives should be modified by taking into consideration incorporation dynamics involving the new immigrants. These members of immigrant ethnic groups may experience more upward mobility than many analysts sometimes conclude based on consideration of immigrants' race and ethnicity alone and based on assumptions that the U.S. experiences of the new immigrants are likely to mirror those of the African American population. That they do not replicate those experiences implies that lumping the new immigrants and African Americans into a single non-White category for which homogeneity of labor market outcomes is assumed masks significant if not complete immigrant economic incorporation.
